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Yves Citton 
 
Political Agency and the Ambivalence of the Sensible 
 
 
Within a few years, the “partition of the sensible” (le partage du sensible) has 
become something of a household word in France.  With this phrase, Jacques Rancière 
refers to the most basic system of categorization through which we perceive and 
intuitively classify the data provided to our senses.  Literary critics, philosophers and 
theorists of aesthetics, but also sociologists and scholars interested in migrations – 
everybody seems to find in this catchy phrase what s/he always wanted to express, but 
never dared to say.  I, of course, count myself among these people seduced by the 
partage du sensible.  Its role as a hinge between politics and aesthetics proves 
extremely useful whenever one attempts to talk just about anything.  Far from being 
weakened by its status of passe-partout, this phrase allows us to dig tunnels under 
disciplinary frontiers, it sets up an interface through which various approaches can 
interact and shed light on each other, it offers a foundational common ground on the 
basis of which we can better root and articulate our various reflections on some of 
today’s most urgent problems. 
Because of its very success and usefulness, I believe that the notion of the 
partage du sensible – and more generally the category of the “sensible” itself – 
deserves a closer look, which will be less critical than analytical:  as in chemistry, I 
believe we need to de-compose various elements which (usefully) come together under 
the compound category of the sensible.  This analysis will also provide me with the 
opportunity to discuss the subtle relations of both proximity and allergy which Jacques 
Rancière seems to entertain with the Spinoza-Deleuze-Negri constellation I am 
currently associated with, through my implication in the French journal Multitudes.  I 
hope to show that what may look like two antagonistic conceptions of politics can in 
fact, and should indeed, be articulated with each other.  Along the way, we will pass 
by an unlikely gallery of portraits gathering dinosaurs, rhinoceroses, actors and 
membranes – through which I will try to map out our current political postures. 
 
 
TWO SIDES OF THE SENSIBLE 
 
I will start by suggesting that the usefulness of the category of the sensible 
largely comes from the fact that it neutralizes the traditional opposition between 
activity and passivity.  In an age when political agency appears as more problematic 
than ever, everybody falls back on issues of sensibility as if it were a protected place 
where the question of agency can be miraculously (if temporarily) suspended.  It does 
not seem to take much effort, much willpower, much creativity, to “sense” or “feel” 
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something.  Common sense tells us that objects and events are impressed upon our 
senses by their own movement, and that it is enough for us simply to be there, with our 
eyes and ears open, in order (passively) to receive such impressions – a fairly 
reassuring and suitably humble perspective, as it is minimally demanding on our part.  
We, people of the 21st century – aware of all the traps and past failures of political 
agency, calls to arms and other glorious revolutionary projects (so the postmodern 
story goes...) –, we like it whenever someone suggests that we can be “subversive” by 
simply sitting there with our eyes open:  our hands are unlikely to find themselves 
covered with blood in the process, we are unlikely to be hurt or jeopardize our (after 
all fairly comfortable) conditions of living.   
For, when a philosopher like Jacques Rancière writes about the “partage du 
sensible,” we understand that this passivity is only apparent:  our sensitivity results 
from an activity of partition and of partaking.  Things don’t just project their images 
upon the blank screen of senses:  we, humans, actively categorize them.  We filter 
them, we select some and reject others, we classify them, according to complex 
mechanisms of distinction that are both socially constructed over time, and 
individually reconducted each time we sense anything.  The fact that we can “develop 
our sensitivity”, our capacity to sense, suffices to show that some type of activity, 
whatever it may be, is involved in the process.  We, people of the 21st century, are 
therefore fully entitled to feel good (about ourselves) when we “feel well”, i.e., when 
we do our best to “become sensitive” to the existence, sufferings and rights of all the 
creatures (women, colonial subjects, gays, and battery hens) that previously fell 
outside of the partage du sensible experienced by our barbarian ancestors. 
17th-century philosophers like Leibniz or Spinoza provide us with a principle that 
neatly catches these two sides (passive and active) of the notion of sensitivity.  They 
invite us to think that our (active) power-to-affect and our (passive) power-to-be-
affected always tend to develop in direct proportion to each other.  I cannot become 
more “powerful” without becoming more sensitive and, conversely, each time I gain in 
sensitivity, I also gain in my power to act (effectively).  A rock can only be affected by 
monotonous gravity, centuries of erosion or extreme temperatures;  in return for this 
insensitivity, it cannot “do” much, except resist winds, fall down a slope if pushed by 
something else, etc.  A housecat is both more sensitive, i.e., more vulnerable, and more 
powerful:  it is sensitive to smaller variations in temperatures, its perseverance-in-
being depends upon the availability of specific forms of food, its happiness relies on 
the whims of its master;  in return, it can, on its own movement, act drastically to 
shorten the life of the mice that live(d) in its vicinity, it can protect its master from 
depression, make him cry, etc.  The same parallel expansion of the power to be 
affected and of the power to affect is obvious when one turns to us, human beings of 
the 21st century, and when one considers how many things and people our daily lives 
are sensitive and exposed to, and dependent upon, as well as how many things and 
people can be affected by our actions (or lack thereof) worldwide. (An obvious 
illustration of all this is provided by the US government foreign policies: the Super-
Power to affect is bound to bite the dust when it launches military expeditions that 
prove insufficiently “sensitive” to the meta-stable realities of the local political field it 
attempts to reconfigure.) 
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This form of sensitivity, characterizing a solution that espouses as closely as 
possible the specificity of the situation it is faced with, exemplifies the bi-facial 
association of passivity and activity I stressed earlier on.  The agent’s power to act 
effectively, its capacity to reach the goal he has intentionally set for himself, appears to 
be in direct proportion with the agent’s capacity (passively) to record data provided by 
the situation on which he purports to act.  In between the recording phase (where these 
data can be seen as simply impressed upon the agent’s sensory organs) and the 
moment when a course of action is set and put into motion, a window opens during 
which “the real action” can take place:  not simply the carrying out of a plan, but the 
very devising of this plan, in light of all the data currently at the agent’s disposal.  This 
“real action” takes place at the level that Jacques Rancière isolates as the partage du 
sensible:  some data are perceived and selected as relevant, others are rejected as 
irrelevant, others still are simply ignored.  Each time this happens, the agent inherits a 
specific social configuration of the partage du sensible, which he can reconduct as it 
has been transmitted to him, or which the encounter with this singular set of data can 
lead him to alter, at an infinitesimal or sometimes at a more dramatic level.  This 
reconfiguration of the partage du sensible appears, within Jacques Rancière’s system, 
as the founding moment of political subjectivation:  whether I stand in front of a work 
of art or am involved in a social movement, the possibility of politics rests on such a 
moment when I am led to reconfigure the partage du sensible I have inherited from the 
majoritarian norm (along with its blind spots, its denial of “rights” and its hierarchy of 
privileges).   
 
 
FATALISM AND THE RHINOCEROS 
 
The capacity to “espouse” a given situation has been seen as a major virtue by a 
number of philosophical traditions, most famously Oriental ones – valuing flexibility, 
suppleness, adaptability, openness, fluidity, dissolution of the self, all virtues 
culminating in the Chinese ideal of wu-wei, or “action through non-action.” Apart 
from Roland Barthes’ deep interest in wu-wei, most notably during his Cours du 
Collège de France on “The Neutral” (1977-1978), which paved the way for a 
dramatically renewed articulation between aesthetics and politics, one important site of 
exchanges between Western thinking on agency and Chinese wu-wei has been 
provided by 17th-century metaphysicians like Leibniz and Spinoza.  While the former 
philosopher was explicitly interested in Eastern philosophy, the “fatalism” of the 
second was frequently denounced as converging with “Chinese atheism.”  Here is not 
the place to study such a convergence between Leibnizianism, Spinozism, “fatalism”, 
a certain form of “pantheism” and “l’athéisme des Chinois”1, but one can certainly see 
why such an assimilation may have taken place:  if the efficiency of my action is 
directly determined by my espousing the lines already provided by the reality on 
which I intend to work, then it is no longer I who act on this reality in order to alter it 
                                                 
1
 On these issues, see my articles  « L’Ordre économique de la mondialisation libérale : une importation 
chinoise dans la France des Lumières ? », Revue Internationale de Philosophie, 2007-1: 9-32, and 
« ConcateNations. Globalization in a Spinozist Context » in Diane Morgan and Gary Bantham (ed.). 
Cosmopolitics and the Emergence of a Future (London/New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007: 91-117. 
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according to my choices and desires;  I find myself in a situation where reality 
transforms itself, evolves, follow its own courses through my intervention.  Isn’t it 
what Spinoza suggests when he describes human beings, along with all other natural 
“things”, as mere “modes”, determined “modifications” of a substance which is the 
only reality endowed with the full privilege of agency?  Whenever I illusion myself 
into thinking that I (freely) act, it is in fact only “the substance” which unfolds itself 
through this part of Nature that I happen to embody.   
Apart from a serious blow to humans who, during the 17th century, were still 
proud of being God’s favourite creatures, a lasting discomfort with such a worldview 
comes from the transparency to which it condemns human (non-)agency.  Spinoza’s 
“free necessity” – which calls for my understanding of and voluntary adaptation to the 
laws of nature – suggests an ideal of (non-)action in which the data from the situation 
would impress themselves upon my senses without any waste, would be wholly 
processed by my intellect, and directly translated into a reaction perfectly adapted to 
all the dimensions of the situation.  The fact that Spinoza earned his living by 
polishing glass becomes an emblem for the ultimate goal (or danger) of his 
philosophy:  to transform us into transparent mediations through which natural 
necessity expresses and follows its own course.   
I know that Jacques Rancière has little patience with this type of neo-Spinozist 
thinking – which, in France, has been filtered through Gilles Deleuze’s writings and 
courses on Leibniz and Spinoza.  When asked in 2004 by the journal Dissonance to 
comment upon an excerpt of Empire in which Hardt and Negri claim that “the great 
masses need a material religion of the senses.” he made a series of remarks that I will 
now quote at length (since this interview seems never to have been published), and 
that I will later comment upon briefly.  After noting that “Negri’s philosophy becomes 
more and more a sort of pantheism, a great pantheism of life” and that, when 
interpreted through Deleuzian glasses, “the Marxist scheme is turned into a vitalist 
scheme”, Jacques Rancière adds : 
 
I believe that [in this neo-vitalist approach] the sphere of politics gets stuck 
between two things:  the sphere of economics, the sphere of productive forces, and 
the sphere of aesthetics in the sense of a new religion, the Romantic idea that the 
community is a sensitive community [une communauté sensible] of people reunited 
by a faith, by a belief which is shared by [commune à] the man of the people and the 
philosophers2.  
 
Let me first raise the question of the relationship that we are to establish (or not) 
between this Negrian communauté sensible and the partage du sensible.  Doesn’t 
Jacques Rancière tell us, through his use of the latter notion, that any community is a 
communauté sensible, sharing a certain partition of what is to be felt, seen, noticed, 
respected, taken care of (or, conversely, ignored, used and despised)?  Does the main 
difference between him and Toni Negri come from the fact that the Italian philosopher 
emphasises the need to form a community, to construct a platform of reunion, while 
the French thinker defines politics as a moment of partition, division, secession?  I 
leave such questions open for the moment, and move on to a very specific and 
                                                 
2
  Interview with Jacques Rancière, destined to be published in the French journal Dissonance in 2005, but 
apparently never released.  My translations. 
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concrete criticism raised by Jacques Rancière against Empire, concerning the view that 
this book proposes on migrations:   
 
in Empire, they write about nomadic movements which break the borders 
within Empire.  However, the nomadic movements which break Empire’s borders are 
groups of workers who pay astronomical amounts of money to smugglers in order to 
get to Europe, workers who are then parked in confinement zones, waiting to be 
turned back.  To transform this reality of displacements into anti-imperialist political 
movements and energies is something totally extravagant. 
 
I read this (fairly common) criticism of Empire as a denunciation of the 
rhinocerian danger that looms over neo-Spinozism.  From the Ancient Stoics to the 
Chinese Atheists discussed in 17th-century Europe and to Leibnizian optimism, all 
forms of “fatalism” have been suspected of being excessively ready to accept reality 
as it is, and to invent hopeful and encouraging forms of coating, destined to paint over 
its various horrors.  In the case at hand:  destitute migrants following the lines of flight 
inscribed in the wood of our global economic imbalances do point the way that our 
understanding should, too, follow, in order to seize the post-national nature of politics 
in the global age.  Fluxes of bodies crossing national borders indicate profound trends 
that our analysis has to notice, to understand by its causes, and finally to use positively 
in our effort to reconfigure the current transformations for the better.  A politics of 
hope finds its foundation in the Spinozian attitude asking us, neither to hate (detestari) 
nor to mock (ridere), but to understand (intellegere) reality as it is.  Spinoza suggests 
in the scholium of Ethics V,10, that, “in arranging our thoughts and conceptions, we 
should always bear in mind that which is good in every individual thing:”  in spite of 
their untold and saddening sufferings – and even if such hardships obviously need to 
be alleviated, and their exploiters denounced – destitute migrants do put national 
borders under a pressure that tends to erode, in the long run, the very sustainability of 
the barriers that currently maintain “totally extravagant” levels of inequality among the 
world’s populations.   
Of course, as we all know, in the long run we are all dead – and poor migrants 
unfortunately tend to die much younger than the neo-Spinozist thinkers who try to 
sense “that which is good” in other people’s sufferings.  As a matter of fact, this 
hopeful acceptance of what appears as deep and irresistible trends of reality has been 
portrayed with remarkable accuracy in Ionesco’s Rhinoceros.  In our post-Cold War 
era, the play can be disengaged from its anti-communist message and become 
available for renewed allegorical projections, in particular as a description of our range 
of attitudes towards globalization, “economic rationalization”, and “modernization” at 
large.  Between Bérenger-the-loser, an all-too-human misfit, fragile and mediocre, and 
his friend Jean-the-achiever, eager to be well adapted, to overcome his weaknesses, 
and to make something out of his life, the contrast is precipitated by the irruption of 
rhinoceroses, who unexpectedly and randomly run havoc in the city, trampling and 
terrorizing people in ever greater number.  The animals soon no longer appear as 
intruders but as humans transformed into monsters by a growing epidemic 
(traditionally read as a metaphor of the spread of Nazism in Germany or of communist 
conformism in Eastern European countries).   
This play could be relevant in a discussion of sensitivity and Spinozism, insofar 
as it stages a certain form of acceptance of the given based on a certain reference to 
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Nature, both of which have long been denounced as inherent dangers looming over 
this philosophy.  The last dialogue between Bérenger-the-loser and Jean-the-achiever, 
which takes place while the latter is going through his own transformation into a 
rhinoceros, summarizes this dimension of the play:  rejecting traditional “morality”, 
and asking for its replacement by “Nature”, rejecting any reference to “Man” and 
calling “Humanism” outdated, Jean claims that he “welcomes change” and has freed 
himself from all the “prejudices” that portray our species as superior to the other 
animals.  It would be very easy to read between these lines a direct parody of some of 
the defining theses of the Ethics:  Man in Nature is no special “empire within an 
empire;” traditional morality and transcendental definitions of Rights must be replaced 
by an ontology of power;  definitions of the good and the bad are always relative, and 
evolutionary;  the relations between individual conatus are ruled by the survival of the 
fittest and the elimination of the misfits.   
Jean’s trajectory is one of refusal of prejudices and of acceptance of reality-as-it-
is: he goes with the flow and finds reasons to see this flow as a natural, inescapable, 
and even desirable reality, a reality in which we can find joy and reasons for hope.  Of 
course, he does not accept it, as Spinozism would like us to do, on the basis of a 
rational understanding of the causal relations at work within this reality:  he is mostly 
carried away by the flow, merely rationalizing the changes that affect him (rather than 
reasoning upon their emancipatory potential).  (And this no doubt points  to the limit 
of Ionesco’s play: no real event inexplicably comes out of the blue like his 
rhinoceroses do.)  But countless criticisms of Empire have presented it as a mere 
rationalization (and acceptance) of the dissolution of the (national) welfare State, of 
the erosion of the status of wage-earners, of the overlapping of work over leisure time:  
isn’t Negri condoning the shuffling around of poor workers by the inhumane laws of 
capitalism when he “extravagantly” presents destitute migrants as an avant-garde of 
the anti-imperialist struggle?   
Bérenger, on the other hand, is the only character that manages not to become a 
rhinoceros until the end of the play:  far from developing a higher understanding of the 
situation, he does so mostly by clinging to rather ridiculous, narrow-minded and 
outmoded prejudices about Man, his transcendent Duties and his natural Rights.  He 
just resists the transformation that affects the world around him, with obstinacy and 
desperation:  he grinds his heels into his memory of how things used to be before the 
arrival of the rhinoceroses.  He refuses to adapt to the new reality that surrounds him.  
Of course, there is an ironical and suggestive chiasm to be read in the fact that, by 
being “sensitive” and reactive to the transformations of our world, the likes of Jean are 
led to become thick-skinned pachyderms, while the short-sighted and thick-spirited 
Bérenger perceives more clearly the mutilation imposed upon his (old-fashioned) idea 
of Man by an adaptation to the current trends.  Similarly, one is led to think that the 
“extravagance” of those who accept the dissolution of “the people” into mere 
“multitudes” results from the fact that their very sensitivity to the logic at work within 
(cognitive) capitalism tends to make them insensitive and blind to the human reality of 
constrained migrations. 
At this point, we seem to be caught between two equally unappealing figures.  On 
the (traditional) Left hand, we would have the dinosaurs of trade-union leaders, 
Communist survivors and populist figures who blame all current social evils on 
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globalization :  like Bérenger, they cling on to unsustainable notions (like “job 
security”, national sovereignty or the so-called “idéal républicain”), they invoke 
mythical entities like “the people” and grind their heels in an attitude of pure refusal to 
budge.  On the other hand (described either as an “ultra-Left” hand or as a “crypto-
liberal” one), we would have the rhinoceroses of the thinkers of the multitudes:  like 
Jean, they position themselves as sensitive and adaptable to the new reconfigurations 
of the given, they are ready to revise and amend their partition of the sensible, they are 
eager to propose new tools to understand, explain and exploit the new state of things, 
in which they positively try to discover constitutive potentials for new forms of 
emancipation – while critics see their work as an extravagant rationalization and 
acceptance of new forms of alienation. 
 
 
FROM THE AGENT TO THE ACTOR 
 
Even if Jacques Rancière’s general definition of “politics” strikes me as putting a 
much heavier load on an attitude of resistance, of secession, of refusal, rather than on 
the positive, inventive and creative work that Toni Negri pins down under the notion 
of “constitution,” he largely manages to escape from this alternative between the 
dinosaur and the rhinoceros by opening an original line of flight in the direction of a 
theatrical conception of political agency.  I find it highly significant that it is in the 
same interview with Dissonance, where he denounced the “extravagance” of Empire’s 
perception of the migrants, that he would articulate most clearly (to my knowledge) 
this theatrical conception as an alternative to the neo-Spinozist tradition emblematised 
by the Deleuze-Negri couple.  Jacques Rancière starts by acknowledging the interest 
of the Deleuzian opposition between the “molar” and the “molecular” as a way to 
escape the limitations of pre-constituted individualities and categories:  the molecular 
approach has indeed played a major role in the “esthetic revolution” that, for two 
centuries, has questioned any given partage du sensible, and denounced such 
partitions as a mutilating “molarization” of the complexity of the molecular.  Jacques 
Rancière rejects however the transposition of this “physico-esthetic” model into the 
sphere of politics:   
 
[The authors of Empire] try to present [this model] as a solution to the problem 
of representation.  The idea is to oppose to a mass, perceived as fixed in its concept, a 
circulating energy without subject.  This is what multitude means.  But the problem is 
that, in politics, one always creates a stage (une scène).  They try to avoid the 
theatrical model.  One could almost say that they try to oppose a novelistic model of 
dissolved identity to the theatrical model.  However, I think that politics always 
takes, more or less, the shape of the constitution of a theater.  It means that politics 
always needs to constitute small worlds on which units take shape;  I would call them 
“subjects” or “forms of subjectivation”;  they stage a conflict, a litigation, an 
opposition between various worlds.  [The thinkers of the multitude] don’t want to 
hear about that.  What they want is a world-energy that breaks up masses.  But this 
does not constitute politics, that is the problem, at least in my view. 
 
This is how Jacques Rancière justifies his clinging on the “old fashioned molar 
concept” of “the people” and his refusal to replace it with “the molecular energy of the 
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multitudes”:  the people “does not constitute a type of group; it is not a mass;  it is 
purely the name of an act of subjectivation”: 
 
For me, politics is never a question of identity;  it always stages a gap (un 
écart).  When one says “we are the people”, I would say precisely that “we” and “the 
people” are not the same thing; politics takes place in the gap between the two.  It 
seems to me that when they oppose the molecular to the molar, they do the contrary:  
they need some sort of reality for the political subject.  For me, politics is the 
constitution of a theatrical and artificial sphere.  Whereas what they really want is a 
stage of reality (une scène de réalité).  That is why they transform any migration into 
an act of political resistance. [...]  This is the consequence of the opposition between 
the molecular and the molar, which in fact always draws us back to the need for a 
political subject that would be real, that would be a truly vital energy at work.  I do 
not believe so:  a political subject is a type of theatrical being, temporary and 
localized. 
 
Jacques Rancière’s escape from the trapped alternative between the dinosaur and 
the rhinoceros invites us to see ourselves as actors, and to trade the vocabulary of 
political acts (with its implications in terms of actions-reactions, activity/passivity, 
proportionality between power-to-affect and power-to-be-affected, etc.) for a 
vocabulary of political gestures.  The sphere of politics thus appears as a theatrical 
stage rather than as a battlefield, as a matter of role-playing rather than as a matter of 
anticipating, espousing and utilizing flows within an organic body.   
Of course, this elegant solution is bound to sound extremely appealing to those of 
us who have special interests in theater, literature, and the arts.  Far from studying 
marginal and obsolete forms of expression, we suddenly find ourselves at the very core 
of the essence of “political action.”  The dinosauresque attitude which appeared earlier 
as one of refusal and secession, vocally denouncing the injustice of the various 
mécomptes at work, but falling short of proposing creative ways to adjust our 
calculation to our pressing needs, this attitude is turned around, now that Rancierian 
politics call us to “the constitution of a theatrical and artificial sphere” (the 
construction of a stage, the design of sets and costumes, the creation of gripping 
characters, the invention of catchy phrases and slogans).   
Such a fuite en avant from the register of political action into the register 
theatrical performance resonates well, not only with Jacques Rancière’s current work 
on esthetics (cinema, poetry, novel, etc), but also with the reflection articulated around 
the notion of spectacle by Guy Debord, Jean Baudrillard and their countless followers.  
During the second half of the 20th century, technological and commercial evolutions 
have turned our mass-communication and mass-consumption societies upside down, 
inverting the primacy of reality over appearance:  no longer a mere (and secondary) 
expression of reality, the spectacle is seen as that which gives reality its very shape 
and strength.  From Judith Butler’s sexual performativity to Peter Sloterdijk’s interest 
in bubbles and foam, a definition of politics as theater is definitely well attuned to a 
major feature of our Zeitgeist.   
The elegance of such theatrical politics also comes from the image of collective 
agency that it projects:  when Jacques Rancière evokes political “subjects” and 
“subjectivation,” he tends to describe a world of “we”s rather than a world of “I”s.  
Those who end up climbing on the political stage they have constructed do not speak 
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as individuals but as (problematic and gap-ridden) collectives.  This may be a discreet 
but relevant implication of the opposition between the “novelistic model” espoused by 
Deleuzian neo-Spinozists and the “theatrical model” advanced by Jacques Rancière.  
The “multitude” tends to present itself as a mere collection of singularities, a chaotic 
aggregation of the type of personal trajectories described from the inside in modern 
novels – while the “people” pre-requires some form of pre-constituted group structure, 
be it strongly organized as in the case of a theater company, or minimally united, as in 
the case of a theater audience, which, in spite of its loose nature, falls into what 
Gabriel Tarde would have labelled a “crowd” rather than a dislocated “public.”   
More generally, les sans-parts are always to be conjugated in the plural within 
Jacques Rancière’s grammar:  the stage is constituted only after they have managed to 
speak as a group – even if this group is always constituted by an inner gap, a tension 
between its “temporary and localized” nature and the universal claims to which it 
appeals.  We can hence see the originality and power of the Rancierian construct:  it 
provides us with a theory of representation where the representatives are the 
represented themselves, even though there is a distance (a gap) between the two 
(justifying us in seeing this mechanism as a re-presentation, and not merely as a 
presence).   
Theatrical politics, however, have always been haunted by an anti-model:  that of 
the Jester, who represents the voice of the kingdom’s lowest subjects in the court of 
the Prince.  The Fool tends to be looked upon with suspicion, due to his deeply 
compromised position as the Outsiders’ voice within the small circle of the Insiders:  
everyone knows that, even if he manages to represent a form of critical Reason at the 
table of the autocrat, he will be tolerated only as long as he does not transgress the 
threshold of what would be really “subversive;”  his main function is not to give voice 
to the voiceless, but to entertain the loud laughter of the powerful.  In other words, if 
he is to remain the court’s jester, the theatrical gestures through which he may express 
the grievances of the subjects are bound to betray these very grievances, by the very 
movement that makes them audible and acceptable to the powerful.  Hence the eternal 
complaints about the traps of representation, and other betrayal of the clerks. 
Within Rancierian theatrical politics, it is no longer a group of (un)representative 
jesters, but the subjects who invite themselves to play the Fools at the King’s table.  If 
there is a betrayal, it will come from the ranks of the spectators rather than from those 
of the actors, since the latter speak for themselves.  Jacques Rancière thus answers 
Gayatri Spivak’s question :  yes, within certain historical junctures, the “subaltern” can 
speak.  These moments are relatively rare :  “politics” for Rancière, like “thought” for 
Deleuze and Guattari, is the exception, not the rule (which is the reconduction of the 
existing “police” or “opinion”);  but it has occurred in the past, and it may be in 
gestation around us all the time.   
The subaltern, however, in Jacques Rancière’s theatrical politics, never speak 
directly for themselves:  it is they who speak, but they do so from under a mask that 
they have painted upon their face, from under a costume they have collectively 
designed for themselves, on a carnivalesque stage they are building with each of their 
interventions.  This precision is crucial because it prevents us from confusing this type 
of political performance with the form of popular spectacle described by Rousseau in 
his Letter to d’Alembert on the Spectacles.  In Rousseau’s idealization of his 
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fatherland, the people of Geneva were a pre-defined collective which comes fully to 
coincide with itself when a troop of militia men dance in the streets, soon rejoined by 
joyful young women.  Contrary to what happens in the traditional theater that 
d’Alembert and Voltaire wanted to see allowed in Geneva, the barriers between the 
stage and the audience, between those who actively play and those who passively 
watch, between those who speak and those who listen, between the bodies that are 
present and the characters that are represented – all these barriers vanish, only to leave 
a community (“the people” of Geneva) become transparent to itself.  The fact that they 
would dance (rather than role-play) emphasizes the immediacy of this presence which 
fully collapses the gap between the represented and the representative:  even if their 
steps can be watched by a third party (in this case, Jean-Jacques and his father), their 
true essence and their goal remain within themselves, they are a self-realization of joy, 
rather than an evocation of something absent.   
Through such dance steps, the militiamen and their female partners assert their 
identity as “the people of Geneva.”  Jacques Rancière takes great pain to tell us that 
nothing of the sort is happening in his theatrical politics.  What is staged is not an 
identity, but a gap between the “we” that is speaking and “the people” in the name of 
which this “we” purports to speak.  This crucial difference takes us from the world of 
Rousseau’s Letter to d’Alembert to that of Diderot’s Paradox on the Comedian.  Far 
from abolishing all barriers and establishing a regime of transparency, this analysis of 
the comedian’s play advocates the erection of a barrier within the subjectivity of each 
agent.  A good actor is one who manages fully to distance his person from the persona 
that he plays.  The efficiency of acting is based, not on a coincidence, but on an inner 
distance and a separation between the representative and the represented, even if both 
are located within one single body.  When Diderot attempts to unfold the political 
implications of his theory, he focuses his attention on the figure of the courtier, which 
seems to throw us back into the anti-model of the jester.  But in fact, he thus subverts 
in advance – in a very Rancierian manner – the model of intellectual intervention in 
the “public sphere” that Kant and Habermas will later theorize.  For Diderot, it is 
insufficient and naive for the intellectual to conceive of himself as “a scholar writing 
for other scholars.”  One always speaks from a certain position within complex 
structures of social dominance and oppression, and, as a result, one always has to pose 
as this persona (a serious, disinterested and rational scholar) or as that other persona 
(the fool, the activist, the despot’s adviser, etc.).  For Diderot also, politics is first and 
foremost a matter role-playing.  One is never better represented than by oneself;  but 
one has to split oneself in two, and maintain a healthy gap between the two, if one 
wants this self-representation to be fully effective.   
The main difference between Denis Diderot and Jacques Rancière on this point is 
that the latter, as we have noted above, describes a collective of actors, while the 
former only theorizes the behavior of individual agents.  This difference, of course, is 
very significant.  Political agency, within Rancierian theatrical politics, seems to 
require the constitution not only of a theater, but also of a some sort of collective 
company.  From politics-as-a-battlefield to politics-as-a-stage, the French language 
interestingly uses the same word:  une troupe.  It is by coalescing into a theatrical 
“troop” that individual speaking bodies become a political subject, “temporary and 
localized”.  Here again, the metaphorical field exploited by Jacques Rancière in his 
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theatrical modelization of political agency proves suggestive:  contrary to a military 
troop, where organization and order are always imposed from the top down, a troupe 
of actors can be more open to bottom-up forms of self-organization.  Given the fact 
that the play of politics is never written-out in advance, such a troupe has to be 
conceived as an improvising collective, along the lines of models provided by the 
world of modern dance or free jazz.  What is at work within the many “small worlds” 
of such units is a complex (and dramatically understudied) dynamics of general 
responsivity, temporary guidance, coordinative framing, opening up of free spaces for 
individual explorations, exacerbation of singularity through common empowerment 
and reciprocal stimulation3.   
To my (incomplete) knowledge, Jacques Rancière has not (yet) attempted to 
theorize and map out this dynamics of an improvising troupe, a dynamics which is 
nevertheless crucial to fleshing out his theatrical model of politics – although one 
could of course read Le maître ignorant or La nuit des prolétaires as early attempts to 
study and understand such collective dynamics.  The question that will lead me into 
my conclusion is however the following:  should Rancière attempt to theorize the 
dynamics of collective improvisation on which his model of theatrical politics 
implicitly relies, wouldn’t he be led to fall back on the type of molecular, vitalist, 
“physico-esthetic” models he rejects in neo-Spinozist thinkers like Gilles Deleuze and 
Toni Negri? 
 
 
MEMBRANE POLITICS 
 
It would be easy (but possibly pointless) to show that a neo-Spinozist journal like 
Multitudes spends a good deal of its issues trying precisely to map out this dynamics 
(for instance in the work of Maurizio Lazzarato and Antonella Corsani with the 
Coordination of the Intermittents du spectacle), or to show that Diderot’s theory of 
politics and justice as spectacle is intricately linked to its neo-Spinozist vitalism, or 
even to show how Rancierian Gilles Deleuze was when he stated, on numerous 
occasions (after Paul Klee), that “the people is what is missing” and that “literature has 
to invent this missing people.”4  In spite of Jacques Rancière’s allergy for the vitalist 
streak of neo-Spinozism, and in spite of the traditional parochial rivalries between 
church-goers of various Parisian chapels, I wonder whether Toni Negri’s “multitude” 
and Jacques Rancière’s “people” are as incompatible as their authors, and some of 
their readers, seem to think.  More precisely, I wonder whether their disagreements do 
not come from the fact that they each approach the ambivalence of the sensible from a 
different, but ultimately complementary, perspective.   
It is obvious, as Jacques Rancière strongly stresses, that the question of 
representation cannot simply “dissolve” in the molecular flows of a world-energy 
supposedly at work in the given bio-economic processes that shape “globalization.”  
                                                 
3
 On such issues, see the dossier devoted to the “Power of Collective Improvisation” in Multitudes 16 
(2004): 131-178 available online at http://multitudes.samizdat.net/rubrique444.html. See as well the various 
issues of the online journal Critical Studies in Improvisation at http://www.criticalimprov.com. 
4
 See Gilles Deleuze, “Les Intercesseurs,” in Pourparlers. Paris: Minuit, 1990: 172 and “La littérature et 
la vie” in Critique et clinique. Paris: Minuit, 1993: 14. 
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Toni Negri himself often stressed the need to go beyond a naive reliance on the 
immediate (re)actions of the multitude, and the correlative need to theorize the 
constitution of collective agents through the actual mechanisms provided by the given 
“representative democracies.”  A Rancierian translation would read:  what stage is 
now to be constituted, on which the theatrical play of mass-media democracies can be 
best penetrated, in order to redirect its plot towards the empowerment of the 
people/multitude?   
It seems to me equally obvious, however, that one cannot simply disregard the 
actual pressure of molecular bio-economic flows, in the hope that theatrical politics 
alone will alter the current relations of power.  Migratory pressures (along with the 
hopes and fears that ride upon them) and productive reconfigurations (whether 
theorized as cognitive capitalism or under rival models) are – at least – as likely as 
theatrical politics to play a role in the reduction (or exacerbation) of our currently 
extravagant global inequalities.  Most migrants are simultaneously displaced, exploited 
“workers who pay astronomical amounts of money to smugglers in order to get to 
Europe, workers who are then parked in confinement zones, waiting to be turned 
back,” and vectors of movements and energies that do carry considerable potentials for 
“anti-imperialist political resistance.”  The real question is not to “choose” between 
one side of this reality and the other, but to try and see how they can be articulated 
with each other.   
The ambivalence of the sensible discussed throughout this article may help us 
make sense of the complementarity between the Rancierian and the neo-Spinozist 
approach.  There are at least two implicit aspects of theatrical politics that inscribe it 
within the Deleuzian attempt to “get out of the universe of pre-constituted 
individualities” that Jacques Rancière identifies with the “aesthetic revolution.” From 
this point of view, the figure of the political agent as an actor tends to dissolve into two 
contrary directions, towards the collective reality of the troupe and towards the 
molecular reality of the sensible.  If we follow the first direction (towards the 
collective), we will encounter the Deleuzian notion of agencement, through which he 
characterized his opposition to the psychoanalytical image of the Unconscious as 
(precisely) a theater:  one of the main points of the Anti-Oedipus was that one should 
not conceive of “desire” in the theatrical vocabulary of representation, stage, or masks, 
but in the constructivist vocabulary of production, fabrication, and machine. In the 
word agencement, we obviously recognize agency, but an agency that results from 
putting things and people together, an agency that does not result from splitting 
oneself into two (the representative and the represented), but from connecting oneself 
in a specific manner to a multiplicity of exterior things.  Agencements are by nature 
collective.  The actor/agent can only act through a certain mode of connection with 
other actors/agents and with exterior things, as they are determined and conditioned by 
a specific situation, by a specific state of things.  As I suggested above, it seems to me 
that, if we take seriously the implications of the notion of agencement, we are likely to 
meet the type of vitalist questions (about the “state of things”: their energy, force, 
production, flows, economics) that Jacques Rancière rejects in the neo-Spinozist 
tradition.  This is the “scène de réalité” with which the neo-Spinozist thinkers try to 
articulate their conception of political agency ( “le mouvement réel”, in Laurent 
Yves CITTON, Political Agency and the Ambivalence of the Sensible 
13 
Bove’s vocabulary):  it appears here simply as the reality of the theatrical stage of 
politics. 
In the second direction, the figure of the actor tends to dissolve into the molecular 
complexity of our sensitivity.  Theatrical politics draws on the active side of the 
partage du sensible, on our capacity to re-partition it along slightly altered lines:  we 
can cross-dress, we can pose as something we are not (“Juifs allemands”, “sans 
papiers”, “intermittents” or “recalculés”) when we demonstrate and yell in the streets, 
just as we can blur the borders between music and noise when we give a concert.  We 
should not forget, however, that we can only do so from a certain given (inherited) 
configuration of the partage du sensible, a “state of things” that pre-exists and largely 
pre-determines our possible work of reconfiguration.  Before taking place towards 
other people (in our cross-dressing, yelling and demonstrating), the re-presentation 
takes place within us, within the activity that defines our sensitivity:  some of the 
features of the situation that were present at the level of our sensory inputs are selected 
as relevant and manage to define the nature and quality of our behavioural output 
(remaining present at this secondary level), while other features are rejected as 
irrelevant or simply ignored (and become absent at this secondary level).   
Since our initial question is that of agency, I would like to suggest that if 
anything can be seen as active in us, it is at the precise stage of this selective re-
presentation that it should be located.  In other words: it is in the process through 
which certain data perceived by our sensory apparatus get to be considered as relevant, 
and make it to the point where they become a deciding factor in the determination of 
our future behaviours (while other comparable data get lost along the way), it is in this 
process that we can be said to become agents (political or otherwise).  This selective 
re-presentation thus appears as a way to manage a situation of excess:  there are too 
many data in our sensory input for us to give an exhaustive account of all the features.  
Not everything can count:  any given state of things carries an excess, which our 
perceptive and intellectual faculties do not allow us to absorb and digest in its 
multifarious wealth;  most aspects of a situation must be discounted.   
I find it significant that such issues of accounting (of counts, excesses, miscounts 
and discounts) play a pivotal role in the manner Jacques Rancière recently articulated 
political disagreement (la mésentente politique) with literary misunderstanding (le 
malentendu littéraire).   
 
Literature has to do with democracy, not as “the reign of the masses”, but as an 
excess in the relation between bodies and words.  Democracy is first and foremost the 
invention of words through which those who do not count get to be counted, thus 
blurring the well-ordered partition of speech and silence which constitutes the 
community as a “harmonious animal”, an organic totality. [...] Political disagreement 
and literary misunderstanding both take to task an aspect of this consensual paradigm 
which establishes a proportion between words and things.  The disagreement invents 
names, enunciations, arguments and demonstrations which institute new collectives, 
in which anybody can be counted to the account of the discounted. The [literary] 
misunderstanding works on the relation and on the counting from yet another side, 
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suspending the forms of individuality through which the consensual logic attaches 
meaning to bodies.  Politics works on the whole, literature works on the parts.5 
 
By its very nature, any partage du sensible consists in counting-in certain 
features of a state of things, and in leaving-out others.  The spectacular gestures of 
reconfiguration enacted on the political or literary stage merely repeat on a large scale 
the type of minute reconfigurations that are performed at the molecular level, when we 
process sensory data into affective or intellectual perceptions.  The “consensual 
paradigm of a proportion between words and things,” as well as the uncovering of an 
excess from one to the other, find their roots in the gap between the superabundance of 
features provided by any state of things and our limited capacity (and need) to count 
some in.  Political subjectivation and aesthetic creation both rely on the same 
mechanism of selective re-presentation6.   
By locating agency within this moment of selective re-presentation, I may be 
suspected of falling back on a very un-Spinozist equation between agency and choice 
– with the implicit metaphysics of “free will” that usually accompany this notion in 
our liberal tradition.  In order to rule out such interpretations, it should suffice to say 
that the type of selection and filtering I have described above is best illustrated by the 
simple workings of a membrane:  even if things are of course infinitely more complex 
in the case of human agents than in the case of fuel cells, such mechanisms can 
generally be described without making any reference to the will (free or not).   
In membrane politics, the emphasis is placed less on the moment of expression, 
as we currently do by seeing the author as the real agent at work in the text, than on 
the moment of filtering, which would bring to the foreground the active role played by 
the reader in the actual efficiency of textual communication.  For, as we all realize by 
now, it is the interpreter who selects, among the superabundant potential meanings 
conveyed by the text, which ones are to be counted-in as relevant, which ones are to be 
discounted, and which ones will remain unnoticed.  As we also know, in this active 
work of partition of the (textual) sensible, a great deal of the criteria determining his 
selections are bound to remain beyond the grasp of his intentional will – a fact which 
should not necessarily undermine the value of his agency.  What matters is the quality 
of the output (the interpretation, the meaning constructed in the text), in its capacity to 
improve upon the current partition between what counts and what doesn’t.   
Such reversals could lead to a dramatic reconfiguration of our partage du 
sensible:  would it be truly revolutionary, totally extravagant, or merely obvious, to 
locate political agency in the figure of the inventive reader rather than in the politician 
who yells the same empty slogans meeting after meeting?  Doesn’t our everyday 
experience already tell us that the curator matters more than the artists in shaping what 
modern art really is?  that a few popular DJs, even if they never open their mouth and 
microphone, have a more decisive impact on a generation’s musical tastes than the 
countless musicians who stomp their feet behind the highly selective doors of 
commercial radio?  that, by filtering which news are fit to broadcast, TV anchor men 
                                                 
5
  Jacques Rancière, “Le malentendu littéraire” in Bruno Clément & Marc Escola, Le malentendu. 
Généalogie du geste herméneutique (Paris: Presses universitaires de Vincennes, 2004: 128-129 – translation 
mine). 
6
 For more on these issues, see the chapter IV of my book Lire, interpréter, actualiser. Pour quoi les 
études littéraires?, Paris: Éditions Amsterdam, 2007. 
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often have more power than heads of state when it comes to steering the national 
political debates?   
Should one say that all such operators of selection work within the register of 
what Jacques Rancière calls “police,” and therefore remain outside of the exceptional 
sphere of politics?  Judging by their current submissive behaviour, they certainly do.  
But shouldn’t one allow for their position to be at least potentially political, should 
they one day decide to throw a monkey wrench into “the consensual paradigm which 
establishes a proportion between words and things” (by venturing outside of their 
usual playlist)?  Another type of political agency takes shape, where the main form of 
activity does not so much consist in taking on a role or in constituting a theatrical 
stage, as in shifting modalities of selection without necessarily opening one’s mouth, 
or without even walking onstage.  Unglamorous as they may be, unafraid of remaining 
in the darkness of remote control rooms, such membrane politics may nevertheless 
deserve to appear on our theoretical radars – as they might be more true to the humble 
and discreet poses apparently favoured by the people of the 21st century. 
 
 
 
 
